On October 1, 2026, NEAR Intents lost $3.8M after an attacker exploited a trust gap between its Omni infrastructure and smart contract, faking deposits across 11 chains. See how the exploit worked, how a 48-hour public ultimatum led to full recovery, and what it adds to the growing list of cross-chain bridge hacks.

On October 1, 2026, NEAR Intents lost $3.8M after an attacker exploited a trust gap between its Omni infrastructure and smart contract, faking deposits across 11 chains. See how the exploit worked, how a 48-hour public ultimatum led to full recovery, and what it adds to the growing list of cross-chain bridge hacks.
NEAR Intents lost roughly $3.8 million on October 1, 2026, after an attacker exploited a trust gap between its Omni deposit-and-withdrawal infrastructure and its on-chain smart contract. The bug let the attacker fake deposits across 11 connected blockchain networks and pull real funds out the other side. What makes this NEAR Intents exploit worth a closer look is not just the size of the theft, but what happened next: a public ultimatum from the protocol's general manager, and a full recovery of all stolen funds within about 48 hours.
This post breaks down how the exploit worked, why it touched 11 separate chains at once, how the funds moved before coming back, and what it adds to the growing list of cross-chain bridge hacks that founders and developers building multi-chain protocols need to study.
NEAR Intents is a cross-chain execution layer built on NEAR Protocol that lets users express a desired outcome, such as "swap asset A on chain X for asset B on chain Y," without manually bridging assets themselves. Behind that user-facing simplicity sits Omni, the infrastructure component that watches deposits and withdrawals across connected chains and reports them back to the NEAR Intents smart contract so it knows what funds are actually available to settle against.
That reporting link, infrastructure telling a contract "this deposit happened, so it is safe to release funds," is exactly the kind of trust boundary that cross-chain systems depend on and that attackers repeatedly target. If you're new to NEAR's broader architecture, including how its Nightshade sharding and bridging history fit into this picture, QuillAudits' explainer on NEAR Protocol is a useful primer before going further.
NEAR Intents sits on top of NEAR Protocol but is designed to operate across many external chains at once. Instead of a single bridge connecting two networks, Omni connects NEAR Intents to a wide set of chains, including EVM networks, Solana-adjacent infrastructure, and newer rollups, so a user's "intent" can be fulfilled regardless of where their assets originate.
That breadth is the product's main selling point and, as this exploit shows, also its largest attack surface. Every additional chain Omni supports is another deposit event the smart contract has to trust without independently re-verifying it at the base layer.
On October 1, 2026, an attacker exploited a bug in how NEAR Intents' Omni deposit-and-withdrawal infrastructure communicated with the NEAR Intents smart contract, draining approximately $3.8 million. The flaw was not in NEAR Protocol's base-layer consensus. It lived specifically in the handoff between Omni's off-chain infrastructure and the on-chain contract that acted on its reports.
In practice, that means the attacker found a way to make the smart contract believe deposits had landed on one or more of the connected chains when they had not actually been made, or had been manipulated in a way the contract was not designed to catch. With the contract convinced the deposits were legitimate, it authorized withdrawals against funds that were never really there, letting the attacker extract real assets in exchange for fabricated deposit events.
This is the same basic pattern seen across years of cross-chain exploits: the contract's logic was sound in isolation, but the data feeding it from outside the chain was not independently verified before the contract acted on it.
The direct cause was a bug in the Omni deposit-and-withdrawal infrastructure's interaction with the NEAR Intents smart contract, not a flaw in NEAR Protocol itself. That distinction matters for anyone assessing the incident: the underlying blockchain's consensus and security model held up fine. What failed was the middleware layer responsible for telling the contract what had actually happened on external chains.
This is a textbook instance of an infrastructure-to-contract trust gap, a category QuillAudits has flagged repeatedly in other incidents:
In each case, including this one, the contract itself was not rewritten by the attacker. The attacker instead manipulated what the contract was told, and the contract acted on that information without re-verifying it against the source chain.
A cross-chain bridge hack happens when an attacker exploits the gap between what actually occurred on one blockchain and what a connected contract or infrastructure layer believes occurred, rather than attacking either chain's consensus directly. NEAR Intents' Omni exploit is a fresh, concrete entry in this pattern, and the category is growing for a structural reason: every new bridge or intent-based protocol adds another off-chain reporting layer that a downstream contract has to trust.
Bridges are attractive targets because they concentrate value from multiple chains into a smaller set of contracts and infrastructure components, while their verification logic is often custom-built and harder to audit than a single chain's native consensus rules. The result is a recurring failure mode across very different protocols:
Four different codebases, four different chains, the same root problem: a contract trusting an external signal it could not fully re-verify on its own. That repetition is exactly why cross-chain bridge hacks remain one of the most consistently exploited categories in Web3, and why protocols adding new chain integrations should treat every new connection as a new attack surface, not just a growth metric.
NEAR Intents' team restricted deposits and withdrawals across 11 blockchain networks in response to the exploit, including BNB Chain, Polygon, TON, Optimism, Avalanche, Stellar, Monad, X Layer, Scroll, and Plasma. Notably, the underlying NEAR Protocol blockchain itself was unaffected throughout the incident.
The scope of the restriction tells you where the vulnerability actually lived. Because Omni is the shared infrastructure layer connecting NEAR Intents to all of these chains, a single bug in how it reported deposits could be exploited against any chain it served, not just one. Pausing all 11 networks at once was the fastest way to stop further losses while the team patched the vulnerable contract.
Once the exploit was identified, blockchain investigator ZachXBT traced the stolen funds moving through the KuCoin exchange before being converted and bridged into Bitcoin. That kind of fund-flow tracing, moving stolen assets through a centralized exchange and then into a different asset entirely, is a common laundering pattern, but it also leaves a trail that investigators and exchanges can follow and, in this case, act on.
NEAR Intents general manager Alex Shevchenko took an unusually direct approach: he publicly stated the team had identified the attacker and gave them 48 hours to return the funds voluntarily. "We have identified you, sir," Shevchenko said, addressing the attacker directly.
Shevchenko shared three wallet addresses, covering Bitcoin, BNB, and Solana, for the attacker to use to return funds under what he called "responsible disclosure." His warning was explicit about the stakes: "You know better than most how responsible disclosure works - this is the last window to use it. After 48 hours, that window closes," he said.
The ultimatum worked. The full $3.8 million was recovered within approximately 48 hours of the deadline being issued. NEAR Intents also reported the incident to law enforcement and engaged blockchain analytics and security firms to assist with tracing the funds, running the public pressure campaign and the formal investigation in parallel rather than relying on either alone.
A handful of takeaways from this incident apply to any team building infrastructure that spans multiple chains:
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