A security guide to auditing permissioned tokens across ERC-3643, ERC-7943, Token ACL and MPL-3643. Five surfaces to test, from eligibility checks and forced transfers to freeze keys, Solana thaw gates and wrappers, with what to check in each before launch.

An ERC-20 audit asks whether balances add up. A permissioned token audit asks two more things: who is allowed to hold the token, and who is allowed to override a holder. The token carries an allow list, a freeze switch, a forced transfer function and usually a recovery path for lost wallets. Each one is a power held by a key, and each has to behave correctly on every route that changes a balance.
This guide covers how to audit the permissioned token standards used for real world assets today: ERC-3643 and ERC-7943 on EVM chains, Token ACL and the new MPL-3643 on Solana. The standards differ in design and fail in the same five places.
A permissioned token is a token that only approved wallets can hold, and that an issuer can freeze or move when the law requires it. Tokenized funds, bonds, private credit notes and equity use them because the issuer has to know every holder and has to be able to act on a court order or a lost key.
A permissioned token standard fixes how those controls are exposed, so wallets, custodians and exchanges can integrate once. Five are worth knowing in 2026.

| Standard | Chain | Status | Where the eligibility check runs | Read this first |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ERC-3643 (T-REX) | EVM | Final | Inside every transfer, against an Identity Registry and a Compliance contract | Token, registries, compliance modules, agent list |
| ERC-7943 (uRWA) | EVM | Final since May 2026 | Inside every transfer, behind canTransfer | The implementation behind the interface |
| ERC-1400 | EVM | Draft | Inside every transfer, per partition | Partition logic and the controller role |
| Token ACL (sRFC 37) | Solana | Audited in 2025 | When a token account is thawed or frozen | MintConfig authority and the Gate Program |
| MPL-3643 | Solana | Alpha, not yet audited | At thaw and freeze, plus an optional transfer hook | Four programs and the authorities set at mint creation |
ERC-3643 carries the most value. T-REX Network puts the assets tokenized with it at more than $32 billion. ERC-7943 reached Final status in May 2026, and ERC-1400 is still a Draft. On Solana, Metaplex announced MPL-3643 on 28 September 2026, modeled on ERC-3643 and built on Token-2022, Token ACL and the Solana Attestation Service.
The scope grows from one contract to five surfaces:

A plain ERC-20 audit covers balances, allowances and the owner key. The rest of this guide takes one question per surface.
Start with ERC-3643, because its reference implementation is public and widely forked. In T-REX 4.1.6, transfer and transferFrom run four checks: the token is not paused, neither wallet is frozen, the sender has enough unfrozen balance, and the receiver passes isVerified on the Identity Registry and canTransfer on the Compliance contract.
Two details matter for an audit.
The first is that only the receiver has its identity verified. The sender is checked for a freeze and nothing else. If a claim issuer revokes an investor's KYC claim, that investor can no longer receive tokens but can still send them to any verified wallet. OpenZeppelin describes the same pattern in a recent review as 'gating on the recipient only'. Revocation has to be paired with a freeze, and the offboarding runbook should say so.
The second is that the other balance paths run fewer checks than a transfer does.

mint verifies the receiver and asks the Compliance contract, but ignores pause and wallet freezes.forcedTransfer verifies the receiver only. It skips canTransfer, works while the token is paused, unfreezes tokens in order to move them and can deliver into a frozen wallet.burn checks nothing beyond the balance.recoveryAddress trusts the agent. It takes the investor's ONCHAINID as an argument and checks that the new wallet is a management key on it. It does not compare that ONCHAINID with the identity registered for the lost wallet.None of this is a bug in the standard. An issuer needs to move tokens under a court order while trading is paused. It becomes a finding when a fork changes one path and forgets the others, or when a compliance module assumes its limit can never be exceeded and a forced transfer pushes the token past the cap.
The registry has its own traps. In the reference code, isVerified returns true for any registered wallet when the Claim Topics Registry is empty, so a token deployed without required topics checks registration and nothing more. If a required topic has no trusted issuer, it returns false for everyone and every transfer reverts. The owner can replace the Identity Registry or the Compliance contract with one call to setIdentityRegistry or setCompliance, and the reference code puts no delay on either.
What to check:
Our ERC-3643 audit checklist goes through the full contract set item by item.
Every permissioned standard gives someone the power to override a holder. The audit question is which key holds each power, and what stands between that key and an investor's balance.

In ERC-3643 the agent role holds almost all of it. Mint, burn, freeze, forced transfer, recovery and pause are all agent functions, so an agent key on a hot wallet puts the whole compliance system on a hot wallet. We covered how teams misconfigure the agent model in an earlier post.
ERC-7943 names the functions and leaves access control to the implementer. The specification requires only that forcedTransfer and setFrozenTokens are restricted, and its security section warns that weak control over them could let assets be stolen. It also lets the frozen amount exceed the balance. An issuer can therefore freeze tokens before they arrive, and a holder watching the mempool can move tokens out before a freeze lands.
On Solana the powers are split by Token-2022 itself. The freeze authority can freeze any token account. A permanent delegate can transfer or burn from any account, and the extension has to be enabled when the mint is created. MPL-3643 sets a permanent delegate only on mints with recovery enabled and points it at a program address with no private key, with a proposer, an approver and a timelock in front of each recovery. A mint created without one cannot be clawed back at all. That is a decision for the issuer's counsel to make before the mint exists.
What to check:
Frozen event must be emitted before the transfer event.ERC-7943 defines six functions for a fungible token: canSend, canReceive, canTransfer, getFrozenTokens, setFrozenTokens and forcedTransfer. It does not define an identity registry, a claim format or a rule engine. That is the point of the standard, and it is also why the audit cannot stop at the interface.

A wallet or lending market that integrates ERC-7943 calls canTransfer and trusts the answer. The specification sets rules for that answer:
canTransfer must include the canSend and canReceive checks, the unfrozen balance check and any pause.canTransfer would return false.forcedTransfer may bypass canTransfer, but if frozen tokens move it must reduce the frozen amount and emit Frozen first.0x3edbb4c4.Findings come from the gaps between those rules and the code. A canTransfer that returns true while the real transfer reverts breaks any integrator that prices or liquidates on the preview. A view function that reverts on an unknown address can stall a router. The reference implementations published with the standard are described there as unaudited and for educational use, so a token built by copying them has had no review until yours.
What to check:
canTransfer against the real transfer. For every input, the preview and the outcome agree.supportsInterface returns true for the ID that matches the token type.canSend and canReceive, whether an allow list, an oracle or a registry, is in scope together with its keys.If you are still choosing between the two EVM standards, we compared them in ERC-3643 vs ERC-7943.
Solana has no hook on a plain token transfer. Token-2022 offers a transfer hook extension, but it adds accounts and compute to every transfer, and the sRFC 37 proposal notes that most protocols respond by blacklisting mints that use it. Token ACL takes a different route, and MPL-3643 builds on it.
The mint is created with DefaultAccountState set to Frozen, so every new token account starts frozen. The freeze authority is handed to a MintConfig account owned by the Token ACL program. To activate an account, anyone calls a permissionless thaw, Token ACL asks the issuer's Gate Program whether the wallet qualifies, and the account is thawed if the answer is yes. After that, transfers between thawed accounts are ordinary Token-2022 transfers with no compliance code in the path.
MPL-3643 adds four programs on top: an Identity Registry for claims and trusted attestors, a Compliance Module for offering rules, a Gate Program that answers thaw and freeze decisions, and a Lifecycle Manager for vesting, yield, corporate actions and recovery. Rules that must run on every transfer, such as lockups and volume limits, use a Token-2022 transfer hook that the issuer opts into when the mint is created.

This moves the audit from the transfer to the boundary:
MPL-3643 is in alpha. Its documentation says it has not been audited and lists it as experimental. An issuer building on it today inherits that status.
What to check:
A transfer restriction applies to the token contract. It does not follow the economic exposure once another contract holds the token.

The patterns repeat:
Wrappers are also where money has been lost. Edel Finance lost $403K in July 2026 through share price inflation in a wrapper around a tokenized stock, one of the cases on our RWA incidents map.
What to check:
The token contract is the smallest part of the scope. A full review follows the five surfaces:

One more item for teams on ERC-3643. OpenZeppelin and T-REX Network announced a partnership in July 2026 to harden the protocol, and the rebuilt ONCHAINID v3 identity contracts cannot be upgraded in place from 2.x. Moving the identity layer is a new deployment and needs its own review.
QuillAudits has worked with 1,500+ Web3 projects, including 20+ RWA teams, across EVM chains, Solana and Canton. If you are choosing a standard, start with Tokenization 101. When you want the token, the keys and the integrations reviewed together, talk to us.
It is a token that only approved wallets can hold and that the issuer can freeze or move under defined conditions. Tokenized securities, funds and credit notes use permissioned tokens so the issuer knows every holder and can act on a court order or a lost key.
T-REX is the protocol and reference implementation that became ERC-3643. The standard defines the interfaces. The T-REX contracts are the code most issuers deploy or fork, which is why an audit should name the exact version in scope.
ERC-3643 is a full system with an identity registry, trusted claim issuers and a modular compliance contract. ERC-7943 is a minimal interface of six functions that leaves the rules to each issuer. With ERC-3643 the audit covers a known set of contracts. With ERC-7943 it covers whatever sits behind the interface.
Not on its own. In the ERC-3643 reference implementation a transfer verifies the receiver, so a revoked holder can still send tokens until the wallet is frozen. In Token ACL, a wallet added to a block list keeps a working account until the issuer freezes it. Revocation and freeze have to happen together.
As of November 2026 its documentation says it has not been audited and that an audit is planned. It is in alpha with access by request. Token ACL, which it builds on, has a published audit from 2025.
It covers the token and every contract it calls, the identity layer, the compliance modules or gate programs, the roles and keys that hold freeze and forced transfer powers, and each wrapper, vault or bridge that will hold the token. Reviewing the token contract alone leaves most of the risk untested.
Contents

From day-zero risk mapping to exchange-ready audits, QuillAudits helps projects grow with confidence. Smart contracts, dApps, infrastructure, compliance: secured end to end.