12 RWA incidents and $239M in losses since 2022, sorted by root cause. Credit failures took 57% of the money. Smart contract bugs took 7.7%.

Tokenized real world assets reached about $39.7B on 16 November 2026, excluding stablecoins, according to rwa.xyz data published by The Block. Treasuries, private credit, tokenized stocks and gold now sit inside lending markets, perp venues and stablecoin reserves.
The QuillAudits Tokenization 101 incident tracker has logged 12 RWA incidents since December 2022, with $239.12M in losses. We sorted every one of them by root cause.
Smart contract logic, the part a code audit covers, accounts for $18.4M of that total, or 7.7%. The other 92.3% was lost to borrowers who could not repay, an outside fund manager, a redemption design that could not survive a run, stolen keys and a manipulated price.
| Root cause | Incidents | Losses | Share of losses |
|---|---|---|---|
| Credit and counterparty | 3 | $136.00M | 56.9% |
| Liquidity and redemption | 1 | $45.00M | 18.8% |
| Key and role compromise | 4 | $39.45M | 16.5% |
| Smart contract logic | 3 | $18.40M | 7.7% |
| Oracle and pricing | 1 | $0.26M | 0.1% |
| Total | 12 | $239.12M | 100% |
The table reads differently by dollars and by count. By dollars, credit and counterparty failures are more than half of everything lost, and one event, Stream Finance, is $93M of that. By count, key and role compromise leads with four incidents, and all four happened between March 2025 and July 2026.
Three incidents (Stream Finance, USDR and Maple) make up 72.8% of the losses. The median loss across the 12 is $7.7M.
| Date | Protocol | Loss | Root cause | What failed |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Jul 2026 | Ostium | $23.75M | Key and role compromise | Compromised oracle signer key |
| Jul 2026 | Edel Finance | $403K | Smart contract logic | ERC-4626 donation inflated a wrapper's share price |
| May 2026 | StablR | $2.80M | Key and role compromise | 1-of-3 mint multisig takeover |
| Nov 2025 | Stream Finance | $93M | Credit and counterparty | External fund manager loss |
| Sep 2025 | New Gold Protocol | $2M | Smart contract logic | Flash loan against a spot price, plus a fee logic flaw |
| Aug 2025 | CrediX | $4.50M | Key and role compromise | Privileged BRIDGE role used to mint |
| Mar 2025 | Zoth | $8.40M | Key and role compromise | Admin key compromise and malicious proxy upgrade |
| Mar 2024 | Curio | $16M | Smart contract logic | Governance voting power exploit |
| Nov 2023 | TheStandard.io | $264K | Oracle and pricing | Thin-liquidity price manipulation of PAXG |
| Oct 2023 | USDR (Tangible) | $45M | Liquidity and redemption | Redemption liquidity mismatch |
| Oct 2023 | Goldfinch (Stratos) | $7M | Credit and counterparty | Borrower default on an uncollateralized loan |
| Dec 2022 | Maple Finance (Orthogonal Trading) | $36M | Credit and counterparty | Borrower default and underwriting failure |
In the largest category the tokens and pools worked as written while the money behind them was lost off-chain.
In December 2022, Orthogonal Trading defaulted on $36M across eight loans on Maple Finance. Its funds were stuck on FTX, and Maple said the firm had misrepresented its finances for four weeks before admitting it could not repay. The default hit about 30% of the protocol's active loans. $31M of it sat in the M11 Credit USDC pool, where the remaining lenders faced a hit of roughly 80%.
In October 2023, Goldfinch contributor Warbler Labs disclosed that a $20M loan to the credit fund Stratos, made in February 2022, had gone bad. Stratos had put $5M into a real estate tech company and $2M into a crypto position, and both were written down to zero. Warbler Labs backstopped the $7M for lenders.
In November 2025, Stream Finance disclosed that an external fund manager had lost about $93M of its assets. Deposits and withdrawals were frozen and its xUSD token fell about 77%. The damage spread because lending markets had accepted xUSD as collateral. The research group Yields and More counted close to $285M of debt exposure across protocols, and Elixir's deUSD, which was heavily exposed to Stream, lost its peg and was wound down.
In each case lenders could not see the borrower's or manager's real position until the money was gone. The fix sits in disclosure, attestation and collateral rules. Maple's current products are overcollateralized for this reason.
USDR was a Polygon stablecoin issued by Tangible and backed mostly by tokenized UK real estate, with a smaller DAI buffer for redemptions. On 11 October 2023, holders redeemed about $12M of DAI in a short window, the buffer ran out, and USDR fell to about $0.51.
Tangible said the assets were still there, and by its own account the collateral ratio after the run was about 90%. Houses cannot be sold in an afternoon, so a token that promised exit at $1 on demand could not keep that promise. Tangible later published a plan to liquidate the real estate and repay holders.
The depeg came days after the project published proof of reserves. That report confirmed the assets existed and said nothing about how fast they could be sold.
The tracker has no key or role incident before March 2025 and four since then. In each one the attacker held a credential the system was built to trust, and the contracts executed valid instructions.
In March 2025, an attacker compromised Zoth's deployer wallet, upgraded a vault proxy to a malicious implementation and withdrew about $8.4M of USD0++. Our full analysis of the Zoth incident has the transaction trail.
In August 2025, an attacker address was granted admin and bridge roles on CrediX, a lending market on Sonic, through its ACLManager. Six days later that address used the BRIDGE role to mint unbacked acUSDC, borrowed against it and drained about $4.5M. The team promised reimbursement and then went offline. Our CrediX analysis covers why it looks like an exit scam.
In May 2026, StablR, a MiCA-licensed issuer, controlled minting of its EURR and USDR stablecoins with a 1-of-3 multisig, so one compromised key was enough. The attacker added their own address as an owner, removed the other signers, minted about $13.5M of unbacked tokens and sold what thin DEX liquidity would absorb, leaving with about $2.8M. This USDR is unrelated to Tangible's USDR above.
In July 2026, an attacker obtained an oracle signer key and a registered price forwarder on Ostium, an RWA perps venue on Arbitrum. The verifier checked that a price report was signed by an authorized key and did not check whether the price was plausible. The attacker submitted future-dated price reports, ran about 20 looped trades against them and took 23,752,746 USDC from the liquidity vault. Ostium has since said more than 90% of affected liquidity providers will be fully reimbursed. The transaction-level breakdown is in our Ostium hack report.
A regulated issuer, a restaking vault, a lending market and a perps exchange all lost money the same way. Each had one credential that could mint, upgrade or set prices with no second check and no delay.
In March 2024, Curio ran its governance on a MakerDAO-based contract on Ethereum. A flaw in how voting power privileges were controlled let an attacker buy a small amount of CGT, raise their own voting power and execute arbitrary actions, including minting 1 billion CGT. Losses were estimated at about $16M.
In September 2025, New Gold Protocol on BNB Chain priced its token from the reserves of a single PancakeSwap pool. An attacker used a flash loan to move those reserves, got around the buy limits and drained about $2M. The token fell 88%. The steps are in our NGP analysis.
In July 2026, Edel Finance accepted wGOOGLx, a wrapped tokenized Alphabet share, as collateral. The Chainlink price for the stock was correct. Edel valued the wrapper using its ERC-4626 share rate, and an attacker inflated that rate about 78 times by donating assets to the vault, then borrowed against the inflated collateral. Edel absorbed about $403K of bad debt and said no depositor would bear a loss.
Tokenized stock teams should study Edel closely. The asset price was right and the loss still happened one layer down, in the wrapper. Every conversion step between an asset and the token used as collateral needs its own manipulation check.
In November 2023, an attacker manipulated the price of PAXG, a gold-backed token, in a thin-liquidity pool on Arbitrum and used it against TheStandard.io's smart vaults, taking about $264K in USDC.e and EUROs. Most of the EUROs were later returned.
It is the smallest loss in the tracker. Gold has a deep market off-chain, and in that pool it had a shallow one on-chain. Any RWA token listed as collateral carries the same gap until its on-chain liquidity catches up with the borrowing it supports.
| Year | Incidents | Losses |
|---|---|---|
| 2022 | 1 | $36.00M |
| 2023 | 3 | $52.26M |
| 2024 | 1 | $16.00M |
| 2025 | 4 | $107.90M |
| 2026 to date | 3 | $26.95M |
The 2022 and 2023 incidents were credit and liquidity failures, where the borrower or the asset behind the token did not hold up. From 2025 the incidents moved to the control layer. Four of the seven incidents since January 2025 were key or role compromises, and the largest loss of the period, Stream Finance, came from an off-chain manager.
The tracker is a curated list, and "every incident" in this report means every incident in it. Several related events sit outside the 12:
Adding them would raise the total. Most are credit, operator or key failures, which is the same direction the 12 point in.
List every address that can mint, upgrade, pause, grant roles or sign prices. Each of those powers should need more than one signer, and upgrades and role grants should sit behind a timelock. We recommend 48 hours for critical operations. CrediX's attacker held admin roles for six days before using them, so alert on role changes and treat an unexpected grant as an incident. Limit what a signed message can do with mint caps per period and with bounds on price deviation and timestamps for signed price reports.
If the token's value depends on a borrower or an outside manager, depositors need to see positions and liabilities, with attestations frequent enough to matter. Set concentration limits per borrower and per manager. If you run a lending market, price yield tokens from redeemable value and the current market price. Several markets carried xUSD at a fixed $1 while it traded far lower.
Write down how long the underlying asset takes to sell, then design redemption around that number. Size the liquid buffer for a run, define queues or gates before launch and tell holders the terms. Test what happens to the peg when the buffer is empty.
Do not value collateral from a vault's totalAssets divided by totalSupply, or from a single pool's spot reserves. Protect ERC-4626 wrappers against donations with virtual shares or internal accounting. Review forked governance code for who can gain voting power and what a successful vote can execute. Fuzzing and invariant tests on share price and collateral value are built to catch this class of bug.
For every collateral token, compare on-chain liquidity depth against the borrow caps it supports. Use time-weighted prices and slippage limits. Decide in advance how the system behaves when the reference market is closed, which matters for tokenized stocks and commodities.
Data is from the QuillAudits Tokenization 101 incident tracker as of 20 November 2026. The tracker draws on QuillMonitor and public post-mortems, and the root cause categories and loss figures are its own. "RWA" is used broadly here. It includes tokenized credit, real-estate-backed and fiat-backed stablecoins, gold and stock tokens used as collateral, RWA perps and yield tokens run by off-chain managers.
Loss figures are losses at the time of the incident and do not net out recoveries. Goldfinch's loss was backstopped by Warbler Labs, Edel absorbed its bad debt, TheStandard.io recovered most of the stolen EUROs and Ostium has committed to reimbursing most affected liquidity providers.
Sources differ on a few numbers. Early reports put Ostium between $18M and $23.7M before the final count of $23.75M. StablR figures range from $2.8M extracted to $13.5M minted. TheStandard.io is reported as $264K or about $290K depending on the source.
QuillAudits is a full stack on-chain security company. We have worked with more than 1,500 Web3 projects, including over 20 RWA teams, and secured about $3B in value. Each root cause in this report maps to part of that work.
RWA and Tokenization Audit. We review token, vault and compliance logic together with the oracle, wrapper and redemption design around them, using fuzzing, invariant testing and formal verification.
OpSec and multisig review. We check signer thresholds, role assignments, upgrade paths and key custody, the layer behind all four key and role incidents. Teams running Safe wallets can check their setup for free with Multisig Inspector.
Smart Contract Monitoring. Real-time on-chain alerts after launch, so abnormal mints and vault outflows are caught early.
QuillShield. Our AI audit agent scans every commit and pull request in CI, and in a full audit it produces a working proof of concept for each finding.
Incident Response. If something goes wrong, our team helps you contain the damage, trace funds and coordinate recovery.
Building in tokenization? Start with Tokenization 101, check your design against the incident tracker, or book a free audit consultation with our team.
Across 12 incidents and $239.12M, the token contract was rarely the part that failed. The reserves behind USDR existed, the Alphabet price feed behind Edel was correct, and Ostium's contracts executed exactly as written. The losses came from borrowers, an outside manager, a redemption promise and the keys and roles around the asset. Security work for a tokenization project should cover that whole surface, starting before launch.
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